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The American opioid epidemic has shifted in recent years away from its 
prescription painkiller roots and toward illicit opioids: heroin and fentanyl. The 
prohibition and criminalization of illicit opioids contributes to increased public health 
risks relative to prescription opioid painkillers, effectively amplifying the epidemic. 
Policy solutions will need to address the harms unique to illicit opioids. Using conceptual 
tools from Ruth Faden’s and Madison Powers’ theory of Social Justice as the moral 
foundation of public health, I contextualize the distribution of drug policy harms as 
contributing to health disparities among disadvantaged groups. This analysis informs 
policy recommendations to meaningfully address the illicit opioid crisis with special 
attention to addressing patterns of disadvantage. Policy interventions that fulfill the 
remedial and aspirational aims of Social Justice entail interrupting the unintended 
effects of Drug Control, i.e. decriminalization, regulation, and access. Non-ideal policies 
that operationalize discrete versions of decriminalization, regulation, and access to 
mitigate the harms of Drug Control are harm reduction policies. I conclude that a 
reasonable next step that ought to be taken in expanding harm reduction is regulating 
heroin via heroin assisted treatment within future supervised injection facilities or 
opioid substitution treatments.  
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Background 
The U.S. is in the midst of a drug overdose epidemic that in 2016 claimed more 
American lives than the Vietnam War (Welch, 2017). The epidemic has come about 
partly from decades of over prescribing opioid painkillers (OPKs) following assurances 
from pharmaceutical manufacturers that their use for chronic pain conditions was safe 
and effective and that the risk of addiction was minimal (NIDA, 2018a). The number of 
prescriptions for OPKs increased from 76 million in 1991 to nearly 270 million in 2013 
(Volkow, 2014). According to Centers for Disease Control (CDC) data, opioids were 
involved in 42,249 out of 64,000 drug overdose deaths in 2016 (CDC, 2016). The cost of 
the epidemic in 2015, according to a 2017 White House Council of Economic Advisers 
report, exceeded $500 billion (CEA, 2017).  
The opioid epidemic exists as three related waves. First, the epidemic was driven 
primarily by prescription OPKs throughout the late 1990s and 2000s.  In 2010 
prescription OPKs accounted for 50% of opioid-related deaths, heroin 14%, and 
synthetic opioids, including illicitly manufactured fentanyl, another 14%, according to 
CDC and National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) data (CDC, 2017; Katz, 2017). In 
response, regulations and guidelines were put in place to reduce prescriptions, educate 
physicians and patients on risks of opioid use disorder (OUD), make OPKs more difficult 
to be misused, and hold pharmaceutical companies accountable. In 2012 the state of 
Kentucky introduced House Bill One (HB1), known as the “pill mill bill”, which contained 
provisions to limit OPK prescriptions. HB1 also mandated that physicians perform full 
history and physical of patients, only prescribe OPKs on a short-term basis, as well as 
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obtain a prescription monitoring program (PMP) report (Huecker & Shoff, 2014). Many 
other states passed similar legislation limiting OPK prescriptions and requiring similar 
PMPs. This approach will be referred to as supply-reduction of OPKs. It was originally 
thought that supply-reduction policies successfully decreased rates of OPK prescribing 
yet were not sufficient to decrease net consumption of opioids or decrease opioid-
related deaths (Huecker & Shoff, 2014; Paulozzi et al., 2014). However, recent data 
show that while volume of prescriptions decreased, the rate of individuals receiving 
prescriptions did not decrease (Jeffery et al., 2018). 
Rates of opioid prescriptions decreased by 13.1% from 81.2 to 70.6 per 100 
persons from 2012 to 2015 (Guy et al., 2017). In pursuit of limiting prescriptions and 
following PMP legislation there was also a crackdown on OPK diversion. Doctors’ offices 
and pain clinics with extremely high rates of OPK prescriptions leading to diversion, 
referred to as pill-mills, were shut down. In Florida, nearly two dozen physicians were 
arrested and over $20 million were seized in the ensuing crack down (DEA, 2011).   
Pharmaceutical manufacturers are now facing lawsuits and accountability for 
their role in the epidemic. Some claims alleged against opioid manufacturers are that 
their products were defectively designed without safety mechanisms, such as the 
inclusion of antagonists or tamper-resistant formulations (Haffajee & Mello, 2017). 
Other claims allege that opioid manufacturers, specifically Purdue Pharma, the maker of 
OxyContin, failed to warn about the risks of addiction or even intentionally misled 
doctors and regulators to the same end (Haffajee & Mello, 2017). However, these 
lawsuits face a barrier in that the FDA approved these drugs to come to market and 
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failed to regulate how manufacturers interacted with prescribers, thus making it difficult 
to claim singular causality. Additionally, prescribers, as the gate-keepers of these drugs, 
failed to appropriately care for patients by erroneously overprescribing and by not 
having a framework for managing OUD. Fault is spread broadly for the epidemic. The 
plurality of lawsuits against various pharmaceutical manufacturers, the failure of FDA 
regulation, and failure of prescribers demonstrate multi-institutional level responsibility 
for the opioid epidemic. 
The CDC and media reporting at the peak of the OPK epidemic focused on 
overuse and misuse of opioids by patients. This climate resulted in increased stigma and 
patients were made to feel criminalized in their interactions with physicians and 
pharmacies (Rose, 2017). Stigma and misconceptions created barriers for pain patients 
to access needed medication. Some patients who were previously stable on their 
respective opioid regimens were forced into withdrawal, repeated visits to the ED, and 
occasionally suicide (Rose, 2017).  
Sensible drug policy must account for the double-edged nature of most 
substances. Opioids are useful and necessary for treating acute pain. They are also 
dangerous, addictive, and lethal. Policy and practice must ensure that people who need 
opioids have access to them while the potentially harmful consequences are minimized. 
However, OPK supply-reduction is inherently forward looking, focusing on prevention of 
OUD in future patients, and has left those currently affected by OUD unaccounted for. 
While OPK supply-reduction was a rational response to decades of over-prescribing, the 
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fact that many people need opioids for pain management and OUD treatment was 
clumsily short-changed.  
Heroin and Fentanyl  
 
OPK supply-reduction has had mixed results and may have contributed to 
unintended consequences. Rather than weaning the affected population off OPKs in the 
doctor’s office and reducing opioid diversion, OUD, and overdoses, some people with 
OUD found a cheaper, more readily available supply: heroin. As rates of opioid 
prescribing decreased, rates of heroin use increased, marking the second wave of the 
opioid epidemic in 2010. During the years of 2002-2013, rate of past-year heroin use 
increased 63% from 1.6 per 1,000 persons to 2.6 per 1,000 (Jones et al., 2015). 
According to NIDA, only 4-6% of people who use opioids for non-medical purposes 
transition to heroin; however, nearly 80% of heroin users’ experience with opioids 
began with prescription OPKs (NIDA, 2018b). According to a 2014 survey by the 
American Society for Addiction Medicine, 94% of respondents in treatment for opioid 
addiction said that they chose to use heroin because (diverted) prescription OPKs were 
too expensive and difficult to obtain (ASAM, 2016). From 2002 to 2013 heroin-related 
deaths increased by 286% (CDC, 2015).  
Heroin use is also a risk factor for other health burdens such as HIV, hepatitis, 
and skin infections. Incidence rate of hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection more than 
doubled from 0.3 to 0.7 cases/100,000 from 2004-2014 (Zibbell et al., 2018). 
Researchers have linked accelerating HCV rates to the growing opioid epidemic and 
injection drug use (IDU). For HIV, despite a long decline, 2015 marked the first year in 
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two decades where HIV infections attributed to IDU increased from the previous year. 
From 2014 to 2015 HIV diagnoses attributed to IDU increased from 2,392 to 2,635, the 
majority of which were attributed to an outbreak of HIV in Scott County, Indiana relating 
to IDU (Dawson & Kates, 2018). 
The third wave of the opioid epidemic came about from the influx of illicitly 
manufactured fentanyl and other opioid analogues in the drug market, affecting not 
only heroin but cocaine and even counterfeit OPKs. Following intense interdiction 
efforts, the market for illicit opioids adapted to manufacture more potent and less bulky 
substances (Beletsky & Davis, 2017). Starting in 2013, rates of fentanyl-related deaths 
began accelerating rapidly, increasing 540% from 2013 and 2016 (Katz, 2017). Deaths 
attributed to synthetic opioids, primarily fentanyl, reached nearly 20,000 in 2016 
(O’Donnell, 2017). In 2016 fentanyl accounted for 47% of opioid-related deaths, with 
prescription OPKs at 34%, and heroin also 34%. Preliminary state-level data has been 
made available from Minnesota and Maryland for 2017 opioid-related deaths. 
Minnesota experienced a 75% increase from 2016 to 2017 in synthetic opioid-related 
deaths, primarily fentanyl (MNDH, 2018). In Maryland, fentanyl-related deaths 
increased from 1119 to 1594 from 2016 to 2017, a 42% increase (MDDH, 2018).  
Policy Focus 
 
OPK supply-reduction is inherently concerned with how the pharmaceutical and 
healthcare industries ought to operate and how people will be affected by those 
industries in the future. But the majority of opioid deaths are increasingly related to 
illicit opioids and not OPKs, at least partly an unintended consequence of OPK supply-
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reduction. As the epidemic has shifted away from prescription OPKs to illicit opioids, the 
harms and risks that characterize the epidemic have also shifted. Policy level solutions 
aimed at reducing death and disease associated with OUD will need to focus on illicit 
opioids, injection drug users, and the harms that differentiate illicit opioids from OPKs.  
Prohibition & Criminalization  
However, Illicit opioids are, by nature, regulated under a system of prohibition 
and criminalization. U.S. Drug Control policy is beholden to, and has helped shape, 
international guidelines on drug policy. International drug policy guidelines started with 
the International Opium Convention in 1912 and have evolved since (Lines et al., 2017). 
The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs stated it’s aims as “concerned with the 
health and welfare of mankind”, invoking a public health focus (Lines et al., 2017). The 
second major drug treaty, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances in 1972, brought 
more substances into the fold of international drug policy (Lines et al., 2017). The third 
major treaty, the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances in 1988, reflected a shift away from a health focus and toward a punitive 
approach to regulating illicit substances (Lines et al., 2017). Within international law, 
these Drug Control treaties are known as “suppression conventions”, which obligate 
states to use domestic policy, often resulting in punitive criminal laws, to deter activities 
identified within the treaties (Lines et al., 2017). 
Heroin is a schedule 1 drug under the controlled substances act (CSA) of 1970 
(DEA, Controlled Substances, n.d.), meaning its manufacture, distribution, sales, and use 
are legally prohibited in the U.S. Prohibition of illicit substances creates policy levers, 
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namely criminal prosecution, at every level of the drug market to reduce supply and 
demand as the primary mechanism of regulating the market for said substances. 
Enforcement of the CSA is carried out by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). The DEA’s 
mission statement is: 
. . . to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United 
States and bring to the criminal and civil justice system of the United States, or 
any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and principal members of 
organizations, involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled 
substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the United States; and to 
recommend and support non-enforcement programs aimed at reducing the 
availability of illicit controlled substances on the domestic and international 
markets (DEA, Mission Statement, n.d.). 
 
 It is worth noting that while public health was once an explicit aim of early 
international guidelines, the words health, prevention, treatment, and recovery are not 
mentioned in the DEA mission statement. This policy framework has been dubbed the 
“Drug War” and the “Prohibition Regime” by both proponents and critics (Nadelmann, 
1990). I will refer to the combination of prohibition and criminalization here as Drug 
Control, and specify between prohibition and criminalization where necessary.  
The supposed aim of Drug Control is to prevent and discourage people from 
engaging with potentially harmful substance use. Studies conducted in the late 1990s 
showed that while substance use decreased on net since the outset of the Drug War in 
the 1970s, drug-related deaths nonetheless increased in the period corresponding to 
increased drug law enforcement, while incarceration rates spiked and the unintended 
consequences of the drug war became evident (Drucker, 1999). Moreover, this policy 
framework limits the levers that can be pulled to regulate potentially harmful 
substances.  
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The supply-reduction response to the OPK wave of the epidemic reflects an 
assumption of the Drug War: that supply/demand-reduction through law enforcement 
ought to be a primary focus of policy to minimize the public health burdens of SUD. The 
end goal of such an effort is, in the case of OPKs, to reduce the number of people 
exposed to OPKs. In the case of illicit opioids, the end goal is abstinence. As we see in 
the current epidemic, Drug Control is insufficient to control the flow of illicit substances 
and reduce their associated deaths, evidenced by accelerating heroin and fentanyl - 
related deaths. Since the primary policy levers to regulate illicit opioids are prohibition 
and criminalization, and these policies have not achieved their stated goals of regulating 
illicit substances, policy makers are unclear how to proceed to curb the epidemic as it 
pertains to illicit opioids. Less conventional solutions will need to be considered. 
Alternative Policies 
Public health officials have instead called for expansion of harm reduction 
services. Harm reduction entails public health services that offer an altogether different 
approach to SUD than Drug Control. Such services include: needle exchange programs 
(NEPs); opioid substitution therapy (OST) like methadone and buprenorphine; and 
overdose reversal medication (naloxone). One harm reduction service not yet 
sanctioned in the U.S. are supervised injection facilities (SIFs). Of central importance to 
harm reduction services is that they operate within the health care system, and that 
individuals are free from criminal prosecution and have legal access to substances or 
paraphernalia that are highly regulated and controlled. Variations of these policies exist 
in the U.S. but face public and political opposition and often struggle for funding.  
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NEPs are a health service where people who inject drugs (PWID) can bring used 
syringes to a facility, sometimes mobile, in exchange for sterile syringes. These programs 
have been shown to reduce rates of HIV, hepatitis, and skin infections among injection 
drug users. Meta-analysis of NEPs in Scotland, Ireland, New York City, Wales, China, 
Vietnam, Spain, Canada, and Australia by Abdul-Quadar et al show that the 
implementation of NEPs is largely associated with decreased incidence of HIV and HCV 
(Abdul-Quadar et al., 2013). NEPs also reduce improperly discarded needles in public, 
alleviating some of the public nuisance aspect of substance use. Because of the reduced 
rates of otherwise costly transmissible diseases, NEPs, and other harm reduction 
services in general also net significant public savings.   
OST is a health service where people with OUD are prescribed a regular dose of 
long lasting, less euphoria-inducing opioids, usually methadone or buprenorphine. This 
treatment option replaces more dangerous substances like heroin with safer 
alternatives that ameliorate the symptoms of withdrawal and interrupts the euphoria 
producing effects of other opioids. These services allow people with OUD to “maintain” 
a state of normal functioning without using illicit substances. Patients receiving 
methadone or buprenorphine do so under the supervision of a physician, and is typically 
for people in long-term recovery rather than someone aiming to taper off an OPK 
regimen.  
Overdose reversal medication is a harm reduction service, the scope of which is 
to simply prevent as many opioid overdoses as possible. Overdose reversal medication, 
naloxone, rapidly replaces opioid agonists from their receptors in the brain to prevent 
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overdose. Several cities have passed legislation that grants citizens a standing 
prescription for naloxone to ensure broad access to the medication among those most 
likely to encounter people experiencing a drug overdose. Meta-analysis shows that 
bystander naloxone training and education programs are associated with decreased 
rates of overdose deaths and increased odds of recovery (Giglio et al., 2015). 
SIFs, not yet legal in the U.S., provide some combination of the above services in 
a brick-and-mortar facility where people with OUD can safely consume substances, illicit 
or otherwise, under medical supervision. SIFs have been implemented abroad in 
countries such as Switzerland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, Spain, 
Denmark, Australia, and Canada. These facilities ensure people who consume 
potentially dangerous substances have direct access to health care professionals and 
basic health care services, as well as sterile injection equipment, overdose reversal 
medication, counseling, drug-treatment referrals, and a support network of other 
people with OUD trying to remain healthy. Meta-analysis of SIFs shows that they attract 
the most vulnerable PWID at the highest risk of overdose or infection, promote safer 
injection conditions, ensure access to primary healthcare, and greatly reduce overdoses 
(Potier et al., 2014). Moreover, SIFs are shown to not increase injection drug use, 
encourage more people to become PWID, or increase drug trafficking. Implementation 
of SIFs also leads to less public injections and less publicly discarded syringes since more 
injections take place in the facility and used syringes can be exchanged there as well. 
Some SIFs even offer prescription heroin in the form of heroin assisted 
treatment (HAT). This is similar to OST, in that a less safe illicit opioid is substituted for a 
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more safe, regulated opioid. But HAT differs from other OST in that the primary purpose 
is not only long-term treatment, but rather specifically to regulate an otherwise 
unregulated substance. This effectively removes the risk of adulterants like fentanyl, and 
reduces fundraising crime associated with illicit substance use (Farrell, 2015). Studies 
show that HAT, though only sparsely implemented, is a successful treatment method for 
PWID who have otherwise not succeeded with alternative OSTs like methadone (Farrell, 
2015).  
Despite the uniformly positive evidence in favor of harm reduction services and 
policies, they face public and political opposition. Many communities that could benefit 
the most from harm reduction services are chronically under-served as a result. Policy 
makers have claimed that harm reduction services send mixed messages, and condone 
drug use or even encourage it. There is a real and rational concern that “supporting” 
people with various SUD in their addiction enables their illness and does nothing to 
steer them towards abstinence. The fear is that if syringes are made more readily 
available that would surely make it easier for PWID to actually inject drugs. If OST is 
simply substituting one opioid for another, what does that do to steer people toward 
abstinence? Moreover, it seems like we are actively participating in and facilitating 
addiction. If PWID know that people near them are likely to carry naloxone they may be 
less compelled to carefully measure a dose, or even test the boundaries with higher 
doses knowing somebody nearby could rescue them, resulting in riskier behavior and 
more overdoses. There are similar concerns with SIFs; the presence of such an 
establishment would provide a safety net that could result in more people using drugs 
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who wouldn’t otherwise. Empirically, these concerns are generally unwarranted, as 
harm reduction services have not been shown to encourage drug use, encourage new 
drug users, or increase crime. However, these concerns make sense on a value-level, 
where the underlying values of abstinence and harm-reduction seem in tension. It 
seems apparent that enacting harm reduction services within the framework of Drug 
Control is incoherent, and these intuitions are not entirely wrong.  
The fundamental assumption of harm reduction is that policy ought to be 
concerned with reducing harms attending to substance use, not necessarily preventing 
substance use in the first place. Harm reduction policies manifest a normative shift in 
the policy response to SUD. The fact that an individual may inject heroin is not in itself 
of moral concern, but the fact that they could overdose or contract HIV/HCV is of moral 
concern. Accordingly, drug policy ought to be concerned with the most salient aspects 
of substance use: its harms. In this way, harm reduction does not aim for or require 
abstinence, although such an aim is consistent with harm reduction. Said otherwise: 
abstinence, the focus of Drug Control, can fit within a larger harm reduction framework 
because the value of abstinence is such that one avoids harms attending to substance 
use. However, harm reduction does not fit neatly into an abstinence-focused framework 
because it does not take a moral stance toward substance use. If a focus on abstinence 
assumes substance use is impermissible, then any concession otherwise is seen as 
permissive, or even encouraging. Thus, expanding harm reduction services while under 
the regime of Drug Control appears to be incoherent. 
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Scope of Argument 
All of the background on the epidemic, supply reduction, and prohibition/harm 
reduction policies up to this point suggests that a coherent solution to the opioid 
epidemic, and SUD in general, remains elusive. When decades of overprescribing OPKs 
led to a public health crisis via overdose deaths, the response was to clamp down on 
those industries multiply responsible for the epidemic. But who or what industries are 
responsible for the public health burdens as they pertain to illicit opioids?  
Blame at least partly lies in the poorly executed OPK-supply reduction response 
which, similar to decades of drug control policies, helped to drive the burdens of OUD 
further to the margins of society. But, I will argue, significant responsibility for the 
burdens of the epidemic pertaining to illicit opioids is due to the policies that govern 
them: prohibition and criminalization. I will then argue that the harms of Drug Control, 
combined with the shifting scope of the epidemic, are driving health disparities among 
disadvantaged groups. Using theoretical tools from Ruth Faden’s and Madison Powers’ 
theory of Social Justice I will show how the harms produced by Drug Control are a high 
priority for policy interventions aimed at improving public health. Showing how the 
most acute harms are produced not just by criminalization but the prohibition of illicit 
opioids, I claim that addressing prohibition ought to be a key focus of Social Justice 
within addressing the opioid epidemic. While Social Justice cannot point to specific 
policy obligations, it can inform what just drug policy ought to aim for.  Out of multiple 
hypothetical ways to fulfill the requirements of Social Justice, I will argue that expanding 
harm reduction policies while leaving heroin prohibited and unregulated is insufficient 
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to make meaningful progress. Instead, harm reduction policies that regulate heroin are 
likely necessary to comprehensively address the harms of Drug Control.  
Harms of Drug Control 
As described above, Drug Control policies do not effectively accomplish their 
stated goals of limiting drug supply and demand, and fail to meaningfully reduce the 
public health burdens associated with SUD. Moreover, these policies are harm-
producing policies, their implementation and enforcement resulting in individual and 
structural level harms that would otherwise not exist, at least not to the same degree. 
These harms are distributed in such a way to disproportionately affect disadvantaged 
groups, driving social determinants of health resulting in health disparities in the opioid 
epidemic.  
The most readily apparent harm imposed by drug control is the harm caused by 
arrest. Illicit opioid users are put in physical and legal jeopardy when they are arrested. 
Arrest and imprisonment are intentionally harmful, otherwise they would not serve 
much as a deterrent for criminal activity. Harm by imprisonment is typically justified in 
order to protect an innocent person such as in the case of rape or murder; or if it is 
deemed that the offender is deserving of punishment. This is not the case for drug 
offenses. The person whom the law is supposed to protect is the drug user them self, 
yet the harms imposed by punishment are disproportionate to the harms of substance 
use (Barnett, 2009).  
Additionally, arrest is a major risk factor for overdose. In the context of the 
opioid epidemic and injection drug users, drug overdose is three to eight times more 
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likely to occur in the first two weeks after arrest than prior to or further out from arrest 
(Merrall et al., 2010). PWID enter the criminal justice system with a certain tolerance 
and by the time they are otherwise free again their tolerance has decreased. If they 
proceed to use illicit substances they are likely to return to an approximation of their 
previous dosage with no way of knowing a correct dosage, and overdose.  
Enforcement of drug laws is also shown to alter the behavior of PWID, putting 
them at greater risk for adverse health outcomes. An increase in police presence has 
been shown to cause PWID to rush the injection process so as to ensure drugs are 
consumed before they can be confiscated. Rushed injection can lead to multiple health 
risks. When injecting in a hurry, PWID are less likely to pre-clean the injection area, 
increasing risk of infection. PWID are also more likely to engage in needle sharing when 
police presence increases. Overdose is also more likely during a rushed injection where 
dosage is not carefully measured or tested for strength (Kerr et al., 2005).  
Enforcement also has the effect of driving drug consumption away from public 
places and into remote, non-public places, such as shooting galleries. When police 
presence increases to enforce drug laws, those engaging with illicit substances move 
away from public spaces into less public spaces. Shooting galleries are thus 
“established” as places where people using illicit substance can go where they are less 
likely to risk arrest or have their substances confiscated. Risk of lethal overdose is more 
likely when drug consumption is pushed out of public space into more remote locations. 
One reason is that an individual experiencing an overdose is less likely to be found by a 
passerby and those present may be less likely to contact first responders for fear of 
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arrest. Shooting gallery attendance has also been linked with increased risk of HIV 
infection from increased needle sharing and unsafe injection practices (Kerr et al., 
2005).  
Proximity to the criminal market is also a predictor for decreased proximity to 
the healthcare system. SUD treatment and mental health services have historically been 
separated and isolated from more mainstream health care such as primary or 
emergency care. Despite having increased health needs, PWID are less likely to utilize 
health care services than non-users (Chitwood et al., 2009). Drug law enforcement 
exacerbates the distance between PWID and health services. Enforcement causes PWID 
to be less likely to access necessary services like existing NEPs, likely because they want 
to avoid carrying syringes on their person and risk arrest or confiscation. Indeed, it has 
been shown that where paraphernalia laws prohibit the possession of syringes PWID 
have reduced access to NEPs. Paraphernalia laws are even barriers to the establishment 
of NEPs (Kerr et al., 2005). 
The prohibition of illicit substances has the effect of causing drug prices to rise. 
Drug interdiction, having the effect of inducing scarcity, creates a “risk premium” 
(Barnett, 2009) for those who engage with the market. Similar to punishment, the risk 
premium burden for illicit substance users is an intentional deterrent, and it likely does 
deter some. Yet, for those who are not deterred, artificially increased pricing imposes an 
undue burden. Higher prices require a higher income for those not deterred. This 
burden has the unintended consequence of inducing at least some illicit substance users 
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to further engage in potentially violent or risky crime known as fundraising crime, to 
fund their addiction (Barnett, 2009).  
Prohibiting substances forces those who are not otherwise deterred to engage 
with the criminal market. This means users must buy from others involved in the 
criminal market. The lack of regulation necessitated by prohibition means that there are 
no legal means to resolve disputes or regulate the market, and frequently violence is 
used a regulator (Kerr et al., 2005). People who use illicit substances are thereby closer 
in proximity to violence than they would be otherwise. Accordingly, their risk of being 
involved in a violent incidence is subsequently higher than if they were purchasing 
alcohol or tobacco, or receiving a prescription from a doctor’s office or clinic (Kerr et al., 
2005).  
The fact that illicit substances are manufactured and distributed in an illicit 
market means there is no oversight, accountability, or enforcement of quality controls. 
Drawing on the lessons from alcohol prohibition, Beletsky and Davis show how the 
pressures of supply-side interdiction have the unintended consequence of making 
manufacturers seek to make increasingly potent, less bulky substances (Beletsky & 
Davis, 2017), known as the Iron Law of Prohibition (Iron Law of Prohibition, 2018). Its 
effects are manifest by fentanyl in the opioid crisis. Beletsky and Davis claim that 
because the Iron Law of Prohibition has been well-established in economics, the 
phenomenon of fentanyl-contaminated heroin and other illicit substances should have 
been foreseen or at least predicted by policy makers following OPK supply-reduction 
(Beletsky & Davis, 2017).  
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The harms of Drug Control policies stem directly and indirectly from the 
mechanisms of supply and demand reduction. Prohibition of illicit opioids necessitates 
their lack of regulation in the criminal market, introducing quality-control risks and 
inducing the iron law of prohibition, driving the risks of fentanyl.  The criminalization of 
people involved in the market for illicit opioids, particularly at the level of the consumer, 
though not exclusively, exacerbates the risks of overdose and contracting disease, and 
decreases access to health care. Drug Control can then clearly be described as adversely 
affecting public health and the health of PWID, imposing harms independent of 
substance use itself.  While these harms may be morally problematic simply because 
they have a negative impact on overall welfare, it is the distribution of these harms that 
raises Justice-based concerns.  
Social Justice 
Faden and Powers demarcate health, personal security, reasoning, respect, 
attachment, and self-determination as irreducible dimensions of well-being whose 
distribution is the focus of Justice. These dimensions are such that any life that is 
seriously lacking in one is a life deficient in what a reasonable person would desire of 
their life, regardless of other projects (Social Justice, pg. 29). Faden and Powers purport 
that the first job of justice is “permanent vigilance and attention to determinants that 
create, compound and reinforce insufficiencies across [these] multiple dimensions of 
well-being” (Faden & Powers, 2008). Their theory adopts a prioritarian view of 
distributive justice, which states that factors that impact the dimensions of wellbeing 
ought to be distributed in such a way to benefit those most disadvantaged (Social 
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Justice, pg. 54-55). To this end they propose positive and negative points of Social 
Justice. The negative, or remedial, point of Social Justice entails policing of existing 
patterns of disadvantage that undermine well-being across these dimensions and 
obligates interventions, policy or otherwise, to remedy those patterns of disadvantage 
(Social Justice, pg. 87). The positive, or aspirational, point of Social Justice is a 
commitment to prospectively design social structures and policy in such a way as to 
avoid patterns of disadvantage (Social Justice, pg. 72) and ensure sufficiency of the 
multiple dimensions of well-being (Social Justice, pg. 95). 
The non-medical factors influenced by social policy that result in disadvantage in 
these important dimensions of well-being are social determinants of health. The usual 
candidates are poverty, lack of education, lack of proper housing, lack of clean 
environment, and lack of social integration (marginalization). A common theme among 
social determinants of health is their relationship with public policy and ability to be 
remedied through policy. And indeed, it is a central claim of Faden’s and Powers’ theory 
that Social Justice obligates certain policy interventions to remedy systematic 
disadvantage, avoid future patterns of disadvantage, and ensure sufficiency of well-
being (Social Justice, pg. 87). To this end, the harms produced by drug policies are 
precisely the sort of targets of policy interventions called for by Social Justice.  
Drug Control and Health Disparities 
The harms of drug control are such that the policies of prohibition and 
criminalization result in morally salient health disparities. Drug control harms are not 
just bad for overall welfare, at least in the context of the opioid epidemic, but they are 
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distributed in such a way to be considered unjust. Health disparities, according to 
Braveman et al, cannot be defined apart from an understanding of social disadvantage. 
They claim that health disparities are “systematic, plausibly avoidable health 
differences, adversely affecting socially disadvantaged groups.” (Braveman et al., 2011). 
Socially disadvantaged groups, defined by Braveman et al, are groups of people who 
experience disadvantage in unfavorable social, economic, or political conditions in a 
systematic way (Braveman et al., 2011). Categories like class, race, gender, sexual 
orientation, illness, or any other identifying characteristic associated with 
marginalization and disenfranchisement are likely to experience health disparities. The 
harms caused by prohibition and criminalization are distributed in such a way to 
disparately affect previously disadvantaged groups, namely people with OUD generally, 
IUD specifically, and African Americans.  
People with OUD, particularly PWID, experience social disadvantage. Social 
disapproval of SUD consistently ranks highest in degrees of disapproval among other 
potentially stigmatized conditions, such as being wheelchair bound or obese (Room, 
2005). SUD stigma can arise from multiple causes. It can be deployed as a means of 
social control by family and friends, or arise from the classifications and decisions of 
medical and healthcare professional communities, or be carried out or mediated by 
policy. While the opioid epidemic has affected multiple groups and social strata, illicit 
opioid users bear the greatest burden of stigma and its harms.  As the epidemic has 
shifted from OPKs to illicit opioids, the stigma that follows those affected has shifted 
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toward more disadvantaged groups. This is partly because illicit opioid users tend to 
consist of other structurally vulnerable and stigmatized groups (Buchman et al., 2017). 
The processes of stigma play a causal role in the distribution of life opportunities 
like housing, employment, and education (Link & Hatzenbuehler, 2016). Generally poor 
socioeconomic status (SEC) is discussed as a social determinant of SUD. However, the 
causal arrows are bidirectional. The stigmatization and marginalization of people with 
SUD can drive a downward cycle of lower SEC, begetting further health disparities 
(Room, 2005). SUD stigma is discussed in health literature as a health determinant to be 
overcome. In criminal justice literature, however, stigma against SUD is actively 
embraced, systematized through criminal laws, and deployed intentionally as a 
deterrent to substance use. Drug Control policies, through criminalization of SUD, 
intentionally harness institutional stigma and social harm against people with SUD, 
resulting in health disparities for already socially disadvantaged groups. The shifting 
scope of the epidemic, combined with the harms of Drug Control, mean that people 
further to the margins of society are increasingly bearing the burdens of the opioid 
epidemic and its ancillary harms.  
While the opioid epidemic has disproportionately affected white Americans, the 
harms resulting from Drug Control policy, affecting illicit opioid users, disproportionately 
affect African Americans. African Americans are significantly more likely to interact with 
police and be the subject of enforcement of criminal drug laws. Prior to 1980 the arrest 
rate for African Americans was 554 per 100,000 and for white Americans it was 190 per 
100,000, approximating a ratio of 3:1. By 1990 these rates rose to 2009 and 363 per 
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100,000 for African Americans and white Americans, respectively, approximating a ratio 
of 5.5:1 (Mitchell & Caudy, 2013). It is plausible then that the side effects of drug 
criminalization, including lack of access to health care, unsafe injections, and higher 
rates of HIV/HCV disproportionately affect African Americans. Indeed, studies 
conducted in the 1990s demonstrated that although illicit substance use is similar across 
demographics, new cases of HIV infections resulting from injection drug use were 
manifold higher in African Americans than white Americans (Drucker, 1999). And while 
HIV incidences have declined overall by 32% between 2010 and 2014 (HIV Among 
People Who Inject Drugs, 2018), incidence fell only 8% among African Americans overall 
(HIV Among African Americans, 2018). The majority of new cases of HIV and HCV are 
attributed to injection drug use (Dawson & Kates, 2018), and it is plausible drug control 
policies are at least partially responsible for the racially disparate rates in HIV/HCV 
among injection drug users. 
Further, white Americans are disproportionately represented in all categories of 
opioid-related overdose deaths, yet the demographics have begun to shift as the 
burdens of the opioid epidemic have been pushed to further marginalized groups. While 
fentanyl and heroin-related deaths have spiked across all demographics, African 
Americans are experiencing a faster acceleration in opioid death rates as a result of 
fentanyl than any other demographic. From 2010 to 2016 the opioid death rate among 
white Americans rose 92% from 9.1 to 17.5 deaths per 100,000. For African Americans 
the opioid death rate rose over 300% from 3.4 to 10.3 deaths per 100,000 (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2016). This indicates that as the epidemic has shifted to illicit opioids, 
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African Americans, who were previously shielded by racial disparities in access to health 
care and prescription OPKS (Singhal at al., 2016), have begun to be affected in a way 
they previously were not.  
Discussion 
Drug Control policies produce the sort of health disparities for socially 
disadvantaged groups that are clearly the focus of the vigilance of Social Justice. These 
harms are morally salient insofar as they exacerbate rather than remedy existing 
injustice. In its negative, remedial aim, Social Justice requires interventions that remedy 
the harms historically imposed by Drug Control. In its positive, aspirational aim, Social 
Justice requires drug policy to be crafted in such a way as to avoid health disparities and 
to guarantee sufficiency across dimensions of well-being. While the two aims of Social 
Justice could theoretically point to different policy interventions, where one set of 
policies are remedial in nature and another aspirational, it is likely that one 
comprehensive set of policies will suffice. This set of policies will need to accomplish 
both aims: remedy historic harms from Drug Control and ensure that future health 
disparities do not arise from drug policy. The scope of policy aimed addressing the 
harms of Drug Control will necessarily involve some combination of regulation, access 
and decriminalization to counteract the harms of prohibition and criminalization. 
One policy proposal to mitigate Drug Control harms is to merely decriminalize 
illicit substances, or at least decriminalize heroin use. Under such a policy, certain 
amounts of substances would be permitted for personal possession and consumption. 
This could avoid many of the harms that are consequences of the criminalization of illicit 
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opioids. It could also embody the focus of Social Justice on prioritizing the 
disadvantaged and those disparately harmed by Drug Control via arrest and stigma 
resulting from criminalization. However, there are serious drawbacks to mere 
decriminalization. The first is economic: removing a major deterrent from the demand 
for illicit substances could, presumably, lead to increased demand and therefore 
increased supply. Without regulation, increased supply of potentially lethal illicit 
substances would only serve to exacerbate the epidemic and health disparities within. 
Further, decriminalization makes a false distinction between user and seller. It assumes 
that we could do away with the harms of criminalization for people with SUD but still 
enforce supply side interdiction efforts. However, many people with SUD participate in 
sales and distribution partly as a means of funding their own SUD. In this way, the 
distinction between being soft on PWID and being hard on people who sell or distribute 
breaks down. So mere decriminalization could remedy some of the harms of Drug 
Control, but it has many drawbacks that would leave the disadvantaged still worse off.  
  Another policy approach that could mitigate the harms of Drug Control, with a 
focus on prioritizing the disadvantaged, would be to expand existing harm reduction 
services. Many public health researchers have claimed that the way out of the opioid 
epidemic is to do just this (Saloner & Sharfstien, 2016; Breen & Fiellin, 2018; Olsen & 
Sharfstein, 2014). People in the field of public health have called for increased funding 
to expand OST programs and increase access to methadone and buprenorphine, 
implementing NEPs where they do not already exist, and ensuring broader access to 
naloxone. While not yet established in the U.S, legislation has been proposed or is 
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underway to implement SIFs in cities like Seattle, Philadelphia, Denver, Vermont, 
Delaware, and San Francisco to mitigate death and disease among PWID (Allyn, 2018). 
Many believe that SIFs will be necessary to mitigate death and disease in the opioid 
epidemic, and they will be, but they will be insufficient. While expanding harm reduction 
services is likely necessary to prioritize the disadvantaged and save lives in the opioid 
epidemic, the harms produced by drug prohibition, namely fentanyl, remain 
unaddressed. 
In my view, the current debate about drug policy and what people with OUD are 
owed misses this central tension: the policies of prohibition and criminalization of illicit 
opioids produce harms that effectively amplify the opioid epidemic, and while harm 
reduction policies can effectively address the public health burdens of SUD, expanding 
harm reduction policies within the paradigm of drug prohibition is incoherent. For 
example: fentanyl test strips can allow people who use heroin to test for the presence of 
deadly fentanyl and thus avoid a potentially lethal injection, but a hypothetical set of 
policies that regulate heroin, rather than maintain its prohibition, could eliminate the 
threat of fentanyl entirely, by eliminating the incentive to sell it rather than heroin. It is 
precisely for this reason that NEPs are successful: rather than a hypothetical 
intervention that would allow injection drug users to test if their injection equipment is 
contaminated NEPs simply offer access to sterile, quality-controlled, otherwise 
prohibited drug paraphernalia. This tension between prohibition and access will need to 
be addressed in order to make real meaningful progress on curbing deaths from illicit 
opioids and prioritizing Justice in drug policy.  
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It seems evident that the best policy interventions that fulfill the aims of Social 
Justice will necessarily involve regulation of heroin. This is not to say the regulating 
heroin is obligated by Social Justice, rather it is seemingly the best option to fulfill the 
requirements of Social Justice in drug policy pertaining to illicit opioids. This means that 
merely expanding harm reduction or even implementing SIFs will likely be insufficient to 
meaningfully reduce death and disease in the opioid epidemic, and thus insufficient to 
remedy the health disparities within. What is likely required is the implementation of 
heroin assisted treatment, similar to other OSTs. This would entail establishing some 
overarching regulatory framework for heroin that would occupy a similar space within 
the FDA as methadone and buprenorphine. Implementing HAT, either within 
methadone/buprenorphine clinics, or future SIFs, would discretely operationalize 
regulation, access, and decriminalization and thus remedy the harms of Drug Control. 
Criminal prosecution may still be appropriate in a limited capacity to limit prescription 
heroin diversion. But possession or use of heroin, consistent with a prescription, would 
not be criminalized, and regulation would be able to at least partly mitigate the risks of 
fentanyl.  Indeed, SIFs in Holland, Germany, Spain, Canada, and the UK that have 
structured heroin prescription programs are shown to be an effective treatment for 
heroin dependence and greatly reduce the risk of adulterants (Farrell, 2015). 
Conclusion 
The opioid epidemic, as it has shifted from OPKs to heroin and fentanyl, has 
become increasingly shaped by Drug Control policies. These policies serve to amplify 
rather than mitigate the epidemic and result in health disparities among disadvantaged 
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groups. These health disparities and their policy causes are the focus of Social Justice as 
the moral foundation of public health. Social Justice requires attention to the role of 
Drug Control as driving health disparities, and policy interventions to mitigate the harms 
of Drug Control. Remedying the harms of drug prohibition and criminalization entails 
regulation, access, and decriminalization. Harm reduction policies that operationalize 
regulation, access, and decriminalization will be necessary.  While expansion of harm 
reduction services like OST, NEPs, and eventually SIFs will be necessary to avoid future 
health disparities from SUD and to prioritize the already disadvantaged, it is likely they 
are insufficient by omitting the regulation of heroin. Therefore, pairing harm reduction 
expansion with regulation of heroin via HAT provides the most comprehensive and 
coherent approach to mitigating the burdens of the opioid epidemic pertaining to illicit 
opioids and ameliorating the health disparities within. This tipping point represents a 
paradigm shift, where prohibition and criminal enforcement are no longer the rule but 
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